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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
Respondents brought this action to enjoin appellants' 
attempt to foreclose on respondents' homes to satisfy purported 
judgment liens. Partial summary judgment was entered by the trial 
court in favor of respondents and certified pursuant to Rule 54(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as being a final judgment on 
October 25, 1989. [R. 626-28.] On December 22, 1989, the trial 
court extended the time for appeal. [R. 639.] On January 2, 1990, 
appellants initiated this appeal before this Court. [R. 645.] The 
appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 4C 
of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals [R. 650], and thereafter 
reassigned to this Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellants' brief suggests that the following issues are 
raised on appeal: 
1. Do appellants possess valid judgments giving rise 
to judgment liens? This question appears to be an issue of law, 
reviewable by this Court without substantial deference to the trial 
court's findings. 
2. Do appellants possess final judgments giving rise 
to judgment liens and allowing appellants to execute on those 
judgments'? This is an issue of law in which the trial court's 
conclusions are not granted special deference. 
3. Was evidence submitted by respondents properly 
considered by the trial court in granting respondents' summary 
judgment motion? The trial court's consideration of evidence was 
within the discretion of the court and is, thus, reviewable under 
a standard of abuse of discretion. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
This case should be governed by the court's opinion in 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 765 ).2d 1278 (1988), and by Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which provides: 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims 
and/or involving multiple parties. When 
more than one claim for relief is pre-
sented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry 
of a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the 
court that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction for 
the entry of judgment. In the absence of 
such determination and direction, any 
order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than 
all the claims or the rights and liabili-
ties of fewer than all the parties shall 
not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other 
form of decision is subject to revision at 
any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights 
and liabilities of all the parties. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants B. J. Rone ("Rone"), Ronald A. Bieber 
("Bieber"), and James A. Gregg ("Gregg") were defrauded of 
investments that they apparently made with Fred and Kurt Vreeken. 
[Appellants' Brief at 4-5.] Rone, Gregg and Bieber have sought to 
satisfy default judgments in their favor based on that fraud by 
foreclosing on the homes of respondents Lon S. and Patricia L. 
Nield (the "Nields") and V. Mark and Nancy Petersdn (the 
"Petersons"). Appellants base their attempted foreclosure on the 
theory that some entity controlled by the Vreekens once owned the 
Nield and Peterson homes, and the homes are, therefore, subject to 
appellants' judgment liens. It is uncontested that the Nields and 
Petersons had no involvement in appellants' dealings with the 
Vreekens, and tftat the Nields' and Petersons' only connection with 
this dispute is the fact that the Nields and Petersons purchased 
homes which appellants now believe were once owned by an entity 
related to the Vreekens. The Nields and Petersons brought this 
action to enjoin appellants' foreclosure. 
In 1983, Rone, Gregg and Bieber initiated actions in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, 
against Fred and Kurt Vreeken and a number of entities alleged to 
be fictitious names or sole proprietorships of the Vreekens. In 
July 1983, in the action entitled B.J. Rone v. Kurt Vreeken. et 
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al., a default judgment was entered in favor of Rone and against 
Money Factors Syndicate; First Federal Finance, A.G.; Aires Plus 
Serv., S.A.; International Investment Conference; and Option 
Writers Syndicate (hereinafter the "Rone Judgment"). [R. 256-57 
(attached hereto).] No judgment has been entered in this action 
as to the remaining defendants, including Kurt and Fred Vreeken. 
In August, 1983, in the action titled Ronald A, Bieber. 
d/b/a RAB Ranch v, Kurt Vreeken, et al., a default judgment was 
entered in favor of Bieber against the same entities (hereinafter 
the "Bieber Judgment"). [R. 273-74 (attached hereto).] In 
addition, default judgment was entered against Chris and Keith 
Vreeken, even though neither of these individuals was named as a 
defendant in the action. [R. 276-77.] No judgment has been 
entered in that action against the remaining defendants, including 
Kurt and Fred Vreeken. 
Also in August 1983, in the action entitled James A. 
Gregg v. Kurt Vreeken, et al., a default judgment was entered in 
favor of Gregg against the same entities (hereinafter the "Gregg 
Judgment"). [R. 295-96 (attached hereto).] Again, default 
judgment was entered against Chris and Keith Vreeken, although 
neither individual had been named as a defendant, and no judgment 
has been entered as to the remaining defendants, including Kurt and 
Fred Vreeken. [R. 298-99.] 
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In summary, each of these cases is in the same posture. 
In each, judgment has been entered against some, but not all of the 
defendants. In two of the cases, the Gregg and Bieber actions, 
judgment has been entered against individuals who are not parties 
to the action. Each of the cases is still pending, and no action 
appears to have been taken in any of the cases since the entry of 
the default judgments. 
At the same time that he initiated his action against the 
Vreekens, Rone attempted to intervene in a suit brought against 
the Vreekens by Kathy and Dale Demetropoulos, who were also 
defraiicifMi investors. Rone's intervention in the Demetropoulos 
lawsuit initiated a dispute as to which of the investors was 
entitled to levy on bank accounts of the Vreekens. Demetropoulos 
v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 
P.2d 1278 (1988). On May 1, 1984, Judge Ballif of the Fourth 
District ruled that Rone had not jitop*krly effected service of 
process on the defendants in Rone's action. Thus, Rone's prejudg-
ment writ of attachment against the Vreekens7 bank accounts as well 
as his default judgment was fatally defective. [R. 259-64,] Judge 
Ballif's ruling was affirmed by this Court in May 1988 in 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960. 
On September 15, 198 /, three years after Judge Ballif had 
held Rone's default judgment to be invalid, Rone, Bieber and Gregg 
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caused the clerk of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County, Utah, to issue executions under the Rone, Bieber and Gregg 
Judgments against, among other things, the homes of the Nields and 
the Petersons. [R. 353-58.] Neither the Nields nor the Petersons 
had been named as parties to the lawsuits initiated against the 
Vreekens by Rone, Gregg and Bieber. The Nields and Petersons are 
not named as judgment debtors in the Rone, Gregg and Bieber 
Judgments. Utah County records do not reflect that the Vreekens 
have ever held an interest in the Nield and Peterson property, nor 
do Utah County records show that any of the parties named in the 
Rone, Gregg and Bieber lawsuits have ever held an interest in the 
Nield and Peterson properties.1 [R. 317-22.] Until the Utah 
At the initiation of Rone's lawsuit, Rone's attorney 
submitted an affidavit to the court in support of Rone's petition 
for a prejudgment writ of attachment. In this affidavit, Mr. 
McCune attested that his examination of Utah County records 
revealed that none of the individuals or entities named as 
defendants in Rone's action owned any real property in Utah County. 
[R. 432-37.] 
The Nields purchased their home in January 1984 from a 
corporation called Red Deer Investments, SA. [R. 314.] Red Deer 
Investments, SA had acquired the property in September 1982 from 
an entity call Red Deer Investments. [R. 312-13.] The Petersons 
purchased their home in March 1986 from D & M Coal Company. [R. 
346.] D & M Coal Company had acquired the property through 
foreclosure of a trust deed. Red Deer Investments, SA was trustor 
under that trust deed. [R. 342-44.] Red Deer Investments, SA had 
acquired the property in September 1982 from an entity called Red 
Deer Investments. [R. 331.] Appellants contend that Red Deer 
Investments was controlled by the Vreekens. 
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County Sheriff posted notices of a Sheriff's sale on the doors to 
their homes, the Nields and Petersons had no knowledge of the 
Vreekens' business dealings or the Rone, Gregg and Bieber Judg-
ments. [R. 325-27; 349-51.] 
When Rone, Gregg arid Bieber attempted Ut execi ite on the 
Nield and Peterson homes, the Nields and Petersons initiated this 
action and secured a preliminary injunction, restraining appellants 
and the Utah County Sheriff, David Bateman, from foreclosing on the 
Nield and Peterson homes. [R. 65-68.] The Nields and Petersons 
also brought claims against appellants for slander of title and 
abuse of process. One year later, appellants answered this 
complaint, counterclaimed seeking to have their judgments declared 
valid, and brought a third-party complaint against Associated Title 
Company , D & M C Da] Company, Briant Safford, Stormy Peterson, Wendy 
Wilson, and Diane C. Green. [R. 600-609.] The third-party 
defendants, with the exception of D & M Coal Company, are officers 
and employees ol Associated Title Company. The third-party 
complaint charges the third-party defendants with having done title 
work for the Vreekens or entities related to the Vreekens from 1979 
-in tncl with havinq la i Jed IP disclose the Vreekens' "questionable 
business methods" to individuals such as the Nields and Petersons. 
[R. 606-08.] 
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In October 1988, the Nields and Petersons moved for 
partial summary judgment on the ground that the Rone, Gregg and 
Bieber Judgments were not final and valid judgments and did not 
give rise to judgment liens against the Nield and Peterson homes. 
The trial court granted the summary judgment motion in August, 
1989. This appeal ensued. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants devote much of their brief to arguing that (1) 
Kurt and Fred Vreeken defrauded a number of investors, including 
appellants, in an elaborate securities scheme [Appellants' Brief 
at 3-5, 11-15, 29-30]; (2) the Vreekens conducted their fraud under 
a number of false identities [Id. at 9B-15]; and (3) defrauded 
investors should be allowed to reach assets of the Vreekens that 
are held under such false identities in order to satisfy their 
claims. [Id. 15-19, 27-31.] These arguments require little 
response. Appellants do not have judgments against the Vreekens, 
and the trial court in this case was not called on to decide the 
merits of appellants' claims against the Vreekens. None of the 
courts in the Rone, Gregg or Bieber actions have determined that 
any of the defendants in these actions are alter egos of the 
Vreekens. The Nields and Petersons are unrelated to any of 
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appellants' dealings with the Vreekens. Indeed, it is uncontested 
that appellants have no claims against the Nields and Petersons. 
The substantive merits of appellants' claims against the 
Vreekens are not at issue in this appeal. Instead, the issue 
before this Court is whether appellants have followed the necessary 
procedural steps to transform their claims into valid and final 
judgments. In this brief, the Nields and Petersons will address 
issues relating to the validity and finality of the Rone, Gregg and 
Bieber Judgments — questions which were decided by the trial court 
— instead of responding to appellants' claims regarding the 
Vreekens' conduct. 
In order to execute on a judgment, one must have a valid 
judgment. The Rone, Gregg and Bieber Judgments are not valid. In 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (1988), this Court expressly held that the 
Rone Judgment was i rival i d because Rone failed to properly serve 
process. The fact that Rone now demands that the Nields and 
Petersons, innocent third parties, satisfy a judgment that this 
Court has lipid to br invalid ii .in outnuje. The Gregg and Bieber 
Judgments are invalid for precisely the same reason as the Rone 
Judgment is invalid. The undisputed evidence shows that the 
complaints in the Gregg and Bieber lawsuits were served on 
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individuals who were not authorized to receive service of process 
on behalf of any of the defendants• 
Even if it is assumed that the Rone, Gregg and Bieber 
Judgments are valid, these default judgments are not final judg-
ments. In each case, judgment has been entered as to less than all 
of the defendants in that action. None of the Rone, Gregg or 
Bieber Judgments have been certified, under Rule 54(b), as a final 
judgment. Because those judgments are not final judgments, they 
are subject to revision at any time prior to the entry of a final 
judgment and they do not give rise to judgment liens. Thus, Rone, 
Gregg and Bieber do not hold judgment liens against the Nield and 
Peterson homes and are not entitled to proceed with their foreclo-
sure actions. 
In their appeal, Rone, Gregg and Bieber object to 
evidence submitted by the Nields and Petersons in support of the 
summary judgment motion. Specifically, appellants object to the 
affidavits of Patricia Nield, Mark Peterson and Diane Green. These 
objections are frivolous. Moreover, each of the affidavits goes 
to the question of whether the Nields and Petersons were good faith 
purchasers who took title to their homes without notice of any lien 
in favor of appellants. Because the trial court concluded that 
appellants had no liens, the court did not find it necessary to 
decide whether such liens would attach to the Nield and Peterson 
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homes. Thus, it is not necessary for this Court to determine 
whether the affidavits are admissible in order to resolve this 
appeal. Appellants also object that certified copies of portions 
of the record in the Rone, Gregg and Bieber actions were improperly 
before the court and that the trial court should instead have taken 
judicial notice of these documents• The objection is ill-founded 
and is, in any $vent, an objection only to the manner of presenta-
tion of that evidence and not an objection to either the admis-
sibility or substance of that evidence. 
Finally, the attempt by Rone, Gregg and Bieber to 
foreclose on th^ Nield and Peterson homes is aii abuse of judicial 
process. Continuation of that effort in this appeal perpetuates 
an unwarranted cloud on the Nield and Peterson titles to their 
homes and constitutes a frivolous appeal under Rule 33 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 33, this Court 
should award the Nields and Petersons just damages including double 
costs and reaso^ab 1 e a 11: o r n e ys fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RONE, GREGG AND BIEBER DO 
NOT HAVE VALID JUDGMENTS. 
Rone's complaint against the Vreekens identifies a number 
of business entities as assumed names or sole proprietorships of 
-11-
Kurt and Fred Vreeken, who were named defendants in the complaint. 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d at 964 n.10.2 Although Rone 
identified these entities as assumed names or sole proprietorships 
of Kurt or Fred Vreeken, service of process on these entities was 
made on Keith Vreeken and default judgment was taken against those 
entities when they failed to respond to the service of process. 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d at 963-64. 
In 1984, Judge Ballif of the Fourth Judicial District 
ruled that Keith Vreeken was not a proper agent for service of 
process. That decision was appealed, and in May 1988, this Court 
ruled that: 
In this case, the Court properly 
concluded that the default judgment ob-
tained by appellant in the action he filed 
was invalid for lack of jurisdiction due 
to the insufficiency of service of process 
on the defendants in that action. 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P. 2d at 964. In so holding, this 
Court noted that Keith Vreeken was not a defendant in Rone's 
action. The business entities named in the complaint were 
identified as assumed names or sole proprietorships of Kurt and 
2
 At the initiation of Rone's action, Rone's counsel, George 
McCune, also submitted his own affidavit to the court, attesting 
that he had investigated the entities named in the complaint and 
determined that Fred and Kurt Vreek€>n were ''principal instigators 
and operators of the majority if not all'' of the businesses named 
in the complaint. [R. 432-37.] 
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Fred Vreeken, who were named defendants in the complaint. 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d at 964 n. 10. Thus, the Court 
found that, "[n]o proof exists In the record other than the 
constable's guess that Keith Vreeken was the agent of or had any 
managerial control for the business entities." Demetropoulos v. 
Vreeken, 754 P.2d at 964. 
No authority could be more squarely on point than this 
Court's prior decision that the Rone judgment was invalid for lack 
of personal jurisdiction. Six years after Judge Ballif first held 
t h e R o n e judgment to be invalid and two years after this Court 
affirmed that the judgment was invalid, Rone again has come before 
this Court demanding the right to enforce that judgment against 
innocent third parties. 
In response, Rone argues that the decision in 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken is not res judicata as to the validity of 
his judgment because this appeal involves different parties. 
[Appellants' Brief at 21-22.] That is, Rone believes that this 
Court's prior decision determines the validity of his judgment only 
as regards I liu Hemeti opou 1 os, " , and Roue remains free to pursue that 
judgment against the rest of the world.3 Rone is wrong, and 
3
 The prospect that Rone intends to continue efforts to 
collect his judgment in the future in actions against parties such 
as the Nields and Petersons is made quite clear: "[the 
Demetropoulos decision] pertained to the priority over alleged 
liens between B.J. Rone and Demetropoulos. It did not invalidate 
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directly misstates this Court's holding in Mel Trimble Real Estate 
v, Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
769 P.2d 819 (1988). Any party may raise this Court's decision in 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken to collaterally estop Rone from relitigat-
ing the issue of the validity of his judgment. Mel Trimble Real 
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d at 454-74. 
Rone alternately argues that the discovery of new 
evidence undercuts — and, therefore, apparently allows Rone to 
disregard -- this Court's finding in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken.4 
Rone, of course, has already had his opportunity to litigate these 
issues and his new claims are barred by res judicata, the principle 
that there ought to be some finality to litigation. In any event, 
Rone's claims should have been brought before the court in his own 
action or before this Court in his prior appeal. Assertion of 
those claims at this point is not proper. 
the judgment as against all others nor did it preclude a readjudi-
cation of the same question . . . .* [Appellants Brief at 22.] 
The Nields and Petersons urge this Court to save other parties from 
the experience of the Nields and Petersons in this litigation by 
ruling in the clearest terms possible that Rone has no judgment 
that can be enforced against anyone. 
4
 Rone's evidence amounts to the claim that Keith Vreeken was 
somehow "all mixed up in this." [Appellants' Brief at 24.] Rone 
does not show that Keith Vreeken was an authorized agent for ser-
vice of process on the entities at issue in Demetropoulos v. 
Vreeken. 
-14-
The Gregg and Bieber Judgments are both defective on 
their face and subject to the same defect of failure of service of 
process as the Rone judgment* First, the Gregg and Bieber 
judgments purport to enter default judgment against Chris and Keith 
Vreeken, individuals who were not even named as defendants in the 
complaints.5 [R. 276 and 298.] A judgment cannot be entered 
against one who is not a named party. Hiltslev v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 
1024, 1025 (Utah 1987); R.M.S. Corp. v. Baldwin, 576 P.2d 881, 883 
(Utah 1978) . 
Second, the defects in service of process which led this 
Court to invalidate the Rone Judgment also infect the Gregg and 
Bieber Judgments. Gregg and Bieber named the same entities as 
defendants as did Rone's complaint: Money Factors Syndicate, First 
Federal Finance, AG Aires Plus Serv, S.A., International Investment 
Conference, and Option Writers Syndicate. These entities are 
identified as assumed names or sole proprietorships of Kurt and 
Fred Vreeken. Gregg and Bieber did not effect service of process 
on these entities by serving either Kurt or Fred Vreeken. Instead, 
5
 Gregg and Bieber apparently believe that Chris and Keith 
Vreeken were made parties to their suits under the category of 
"John Doe" defendants. [Appellants' Brief at 30-31.] Although 
"John Doe" defendants were named in the Gregg and Bieber actions, 
no effort appears to have been made in those cases to join Chris 
and Keith Vreeken as named parties who had been identified as 
previously unknown defendants. 
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Gregg and Bieber attempted service of process on these entities by 
serving one Chris Vreeken. [R. 1653-56, 1658-59, 1709-10, 1712-
15.] Finally, the same constable served process in the Rone action 
and in the Gregg and Bieber actions. In hearings in the Rone 
action, before Judge Ballif, this constable testified that he 
served process on both Chris Vreeken and Keith Vreeken in these 
suits and that he decided that Chris Vreeken was authorized to 
receive that process on behalf of the entities named in the Gregg 
and Bieber complaints on exactly the same basis that he decided 
Keith Vreeken was authorized to receive process in the Rone 
lawsuit. In each case, the constable determined that Keith and 
Chris Vreeken were agents for those entities based on his guess 
that Keith and Chris Vreeken were somehow connected with Fred 
Vreeken's business. [Transcript of Hearing, 2/23/84, at 20-44, R. 
1201-25 esp. at 36, R. 1217]. 
This Court has already determined that Keith Vreeken was 
not a proper agent for service of process on these entities and 
that Rone's Judgment against these entities was, therefore, 
invalid. The same undisputed facts and testimony establishes that 
Chris Vreeken was not a proper agent for service of process on 
these entities. Insofar as service of process is concerned, the 
facts with respect to Chris Vreeken are the same as those with 
respect to Keith Vreeken. The Court's holding in Demetropoulos v. 
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Vreeken, therefore, establishes that the Gregg and Bieber judgments 
are invalid because service was not properly made on the defendants 
against whom default judgment was taken. 
Under this Court's holding in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 
Rone, Gregg and Bieber do not possess valid judgments. Because 
Rone, Gregg and Bieber do not have valid judgments, no judgment 
lien has ever arisen against the Nield and Peterson homes and Rone, 
Gregg and Bieber are not entitled to foreclose judgment liens 
against those homes. 
II. THE RONE, GREGG AND BIEBER JUDGMENTS 
ARE NOT FINAL JUDGMENTS. 
Each of the Rone, Gregg and Bieber Judgments is a default 
judgment against some, but not all, of the parties named as 
defendants in those actions. Because no judgment has ever been 
taken against the remaining defendants in those actions, the 
actions are still pending. None of the Rone, Gregg or Bieber 
Judgments were certified by the trial court, pursuant to Rule 54(b) 
as being a "final judgment." Because the Rone, Gregg and Bieber 
Judgments are not final judgments, they do not give rise to 
judgment liens. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-22-1 provides that a "judgment 
lien" shall arise against all property owned by the debtor in the 
county in which the judgment is entered on docketing of the 
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judgment. Utah Code Ann, Section 78-22-1 does not define what sort 
of judgment allows for the creation of this judgment lien. Rule 
54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, however, identifies the 
sort of judgments that are final andf therefore, appealable. Rule 
54(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, 
"'[J]udgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any 
order from which an appeal lies." Under Rule 54(b), a judgment is 
not final unless it adjudicates all claims against all parties, 
A judgment with respect to less than all claims or against less 
than all of the parties can be made final only if certified by the 
trial court pursuant to Rule 54(b). Construing the requirements 
of Rule 54(b), the Utah Supreme Court has noted that: 
In the absence of such a determination 
[i.e., that a judgment in a multiple party 
case is a final judgment] and direction, 
any order or other form of decision, 
however designated, which adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims or the rights 
and liabilities of fewer than all of the 
parties shall not terminate the action as 
to any of the claims or parties, and the 
order or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the entry 
of judgment abjudicating all the claims 
and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties. 
Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc. 600 P.2d 534, 536-37 (Utah 1979) 
(emphasis added). 
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Because the Rone, Gregg and Bieber Judgments did not 
terminate the action, were not appealable rulings, and remain 
subject to revision by the Court, none of those judgments qualifies 
as a final judgment, and none of those judgments gave rise to a 
judgment lien* In their brief to this Court, Rone, Gregg and 
Bieber respond in some detail to this analysis. [See Appellants' 
Brief at pp. 31-37.] Although appellants' argument is not always 
clear, it appears that they advance three reasons for claiming that 
Rule 54(b) does not prevent their attempts to execute on the Rone, 
Gregg and Bieber Judgments. First, appellants argue that no Utah 
case squarely holds that the absence of a Rule 54(b) certification 
prevents a judgment as to less than all parties or less than all 
claims from being final for purposes of execution. Second, 
appellants argue that cases in other jurisdictions that appear to 
so hold, are distinguishable. Third, appellants contend that Utah 
statute and public policy argue against such a position. 
Appellants are correct in noting that the Utah Supreme 
Court has not directly held that a judgment as to less than all 
parties or all claims is not final for purposes of execution, 
unless certified pursuant to Rule 54(b). However, that fact does 
not exhaust the guidance given by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
application of Rule 54(b). In recent years, the Supreme Court has 
had repeated occasion to construe the requirements of Rule 54(b) 
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in the context of when orders are appealable. In these decisions, 
the Supreme Court has noted that because few Utah cases deal with 
Rule 54(b), Utah Courts should follow federal decisions construing 
the identical provisions of the Federal Rule 54(b): 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah R. Civ. P. is 
"modeled after and is identical in all 
material respects with [Rule 54(b) of the 
Fed. R. Civ. P.]." . . . Therefore, we 
rely heavily upon decisions under the 
federal rule to explain the operation and 
underlying rationale of our Rule 54(b). 
Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist. , 724 P.2d 960, 965 (Utah 
1986). See Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 
1984) . Thus, while the Utah Supreme Court may not have expressly 
ruled on whether Rule 54(b) governs the finality of a judgment for 
purposes of execution, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that 
this Court should look to federal decisions on that question as a 
source of guidance. 
Federal courts have consistently held that a party may 
not execute on a judgment as to less than all claims or all parties 
unless that judgment has been certified as final pursuant to Rule 
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has noted 
that a party receiving a judgment in its favor as to fewer than all 
of the claims or parties: 
[H]as no judgment upon which an execution 
may issue prior to adjudication of the 
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case in its entirety. [Rule 54(b),s] 
requirement of explication in the two 
respects mentioned is not a technicality 
in the interest of form; rather, it serves 
primarily the important function of denot-
ing unmistakably that a final order has 
been entered so that the losing party may 
either file a timely appeal or pay the 
judgment. We think the role Rule 54(b) 
plays with reference to the finality of 
the judgment for purposes of appeal has 
implications as regards its finality for 
purposes of execution as well. 
Redding & Co. v. Russwine Constr. Corp., 417 F.2d 721, 727 (D.C. 
Cir. 1969). Similarly, a federal district court has held that: 
A judgment entered in a multiple party 
and/or multiple claims case prior to the 
disposition of the entire case is not 
enforceable unless the requirements of 
Rule 54(b) are followed. 
Gauthier v. Crosby Marine Serv.. Inc., 590 F. Supp. 171, 176 (E.D. 
La. 1984)(cites omitted). Finally, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held that: 
A partial adjudication of an action 
absent a Rule 54(b) certification remains 
interlocutory and "is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims." . . . Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 54(b). An important effect of 
a 54(b) certification is that the entry of 
judgment permits prompt execution. 
Bank of Lincolnwood v. Fed. Leasing, Inc., 622 F.2d 944, 951 (7th 
Cir. 1980)(conversely, "the process of collecting upon an adjudi-
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cated claim can only commence after a final judgment has been 
entered." 622 F.2d at 950 n.7.) 
The same rule appears also to be uniformly followed by 
state courts as well. For example, the Arizona Court of Appeals 
in Arizona Farmers Prod. Credit Assoc, v. Stewart Title & Trust of 
Tucson, 24 Ariz. App. 5, 535 P.2d 33 (1975) , concluded that a 
default judgment which disposed of only two of three counts in the 
plaintiff's complaint did not allow for the creation of a judgment 
lien because: 
Although these statutes provide for 
the creation and enforcement of judgment 
liens, neither defines the term judgment. 
Indeed, each presupposes the existence of 
a valid judgment. Rule 54(a), Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., however, does 
define the term. It provides that judg-
ment as used in the Rules "includes a 
decree and an order from which an appeal 
lies." 
* * * * 
In the instant case, the "judgment" 
which the appellant recorded and sought to 
enforce was not a judgment within the 
meaning of Rule 54(a). 
Arizona Farmers Prod. Credit Assoc, v. Stewart Title & Trust of 
Tucson, 535 P.2d at 35. 
Appellants attempt to distinguish the Arizona Farmers 
Prod. Credit Assoc, case from the present litigation by pointing 
out that ArigoP3 Farmer? Prodt Credit Assoc?, involved an order that 
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settled less than all of the claims, while the present litigation 
involves an order that resolves claims against less than all 
parties. [Appellants' Brief at 31.] This is a distinction without 
a difference. The provisions of Rule 54(b) apply identically to 
orders that settle less than all claims and orders that resolve 
claims against less than all parties. Neither is final unless 
certified as such by the court. 
More recently, the Kansas Court of Appeals held in City 
of Salina v. Star B, Inc. , 11 Kan. App. 2d 639, 731 P.2d 1290 
(1987), that: 
Entry of a final judgment as to less than 
all the claims or for less than all the 
parties in an action involving multiple 
claims or parties is not effective unless 
the court makes "an express determination 
that there is no just reason for delay" 
and "an express direction for the entry of 
judgment" as required by K.S.A. 60-254(b) 
. . . . If the court grants judgment on 
less than all the claims or for less than 
all the parties in an action, that does 
not certify the judgment as required in 
K.S.A. 60-254(b) and 60-258, it has not 
made an entry of judgment required by 60-
2202(a), and no judgment lien attaches to 
the property of the adversely affected 
party or parties. 
City of Salina v. Star B. Inc.. 731 P.2d at 1294, aff'd, 739 P.2d 
933 (Kan. 1987). 
Again, Rone, Gregg and Bieber attempt to distinguish this 
Kansas case, "because Kansas' legislature has mandated a specific 
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procedure and steps which must be taken to get a judgment lien to 
attach and has spelled out special requirements different than our 
Utah legislature." [Appellants/ Brief at 32.] Appellants identify 
none of the alleged special requirements adopted by the Kansas 
legislature, nor do they specify the manner in which any such 
alleged differences render this case distinguishable. Analysis of 
the relevant Kansas statutes, which are set forth in the Citv of 
Salina decision at pages 1293-94, demonstrates that there are no 
relevant distinctions between the requirements under Kansas law and 
Utah law on these issues. The judgment lien statutes of neither 
state appear to identify the sort of judgments that give rise to 
a judgment lien. The definition of what judgments are final for 
purposes of appeal or execution under either Kansas or Utah law is 
set forth in Rule 54(b), and Kansas'' Rule 54(b), Codified as K.S.A. 
60-254(b), is the same as Utah's Rule 54(b). 
Finally, Rone, Gregg and Bieber argue that public policy 
mandates that the requirements of Rule 54(b) should not restrict 
the rights of judgment creditors to execute on judgments. The 
sense of appellants' public policy argument is not entirely clear. 
However, appellants appear, in summary, to claim that public policy 
favors swift execution upon judgments and Rule 54(b) constitutes 
an unwarranted and overly technical restriction upon such swift 
execution. rSee e.g. Appellants' Brief at 33-35.] 
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While it is true that the law should favor making injured 
parties whole through the swift resolution of disputes, appellants 
simply ignore the competing public policies that must be reconciled 
to achieve this goal. For example, a plaintiff's swift recovery 
of his losses cannot be accomplished by completely ignoring the 
requirements of due process and adherence to fair and orderly 
procedures. Appellants' public policy argument is wrong for at 
least three reasons. 
First, the requirement that disputes must be fully 
resolved before there can be recovery on a judgment, except where 
a partial judgment is properly certified as final under Rule 54(b), 
encourages parties to bring litigation to a close and assures that 
the ultimate judgment will fairly reflect the actual liability of 
all parties. The experience in the Rone, Gregg and Bieber lawsuits 
readily illustrates the problems with the procedure advocated by 
appellants. The Rone, Gregg and Bieber actions have been pending 
now for seven years with no indication that those cases will ever 
be brought to final judgment. Those cases have been the source of 
two appeals before this Court in litigation against innocent third 
parties, without a final, appealable order having ever been entered 
in any of these cases. 
Although Rone, Gregg and Bieber claim that the entities 
named in their default judgments are alter egos of Kurt and Fred 
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Vreeken, they have never pursued final judgments in their actions 
to test that theory. In this appeal, Rone, Gregg and Bieber appear 
to simply assume that they already have judgments against Kurt and 
Fred Vreeken, because appellants have judgments against the 
Vreekens' alleged alter egos: 
If all those named as defendants are found 
to be one and the same as far as liability 
and identity go, then all of the defen-
dants have in fact been adjudicated and a 
judgment rendered against them. 
[Appellants' Brief at 20.] Indeed, appellants appear to have acted 
on this belief in attempting to execute on their judgments. 
Appellants have assumed that all of the entities named in their 
judgments, the Vreekens, and any entities that appellants believe 
are associated with the Vreekens are fair game for execution. For 
example, the Nield and Peterson homes have never been owned by any 
entity named in the Rone, Gregg or Bieber Judgments. Instead, 
appellants argue that the homes were once owned by an entity 
controlled by the Vreekens. Thus, even though no court has 
determined that the Vreekens are liable to appellants or that any 
entity that owned the Nield or Peterson homes is an alter ego of 
the Vreekens, appellants have acted — to the substantial detri-
ments of the Nields and Petersons — as if those were fully 
adjudicated facts. 
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In sum, the Rone, Gregg and Bieber lawsuits are a 
procedural mess that have generated repeated collateral actions 
against third-parties. Although Rone, Gregg and Bieber act as if 
their claims had been fully litigated, no final judgment appears 
likely in those cases after seven years. Certainly, much of this 
failure of the litigation system might have been avoided if Rone, 
Gregg and Bieber had followed the finality of judgment rules set 
forth in Rule 54. 
Second, appellants' argument that partial judgments 
should be subject to execution as soon as they are entered would 
significantly prejudice the rights of defendants. That is, Rone, 
Gregg and Bieber would require defendants to satisfy judgments 
without being able to immediately appeal those judgments because 
they were not final under Rule 54. For example, the court in 
Redding & Co. v. Russwine Constr. Co., 417 F.2d 721 (D.C. Ct. App. 
1969) , faced just such a situation where the trial court entered 
a judgment against less than all of the defendants, directed that 
plaintiff could execute on the judgment, but declined to certify 
the judgment as final under Rule 54(b). The Circuit Court for the 
District of Columbia concluded the trial court had placed the 
defendant in an intolerable dilemma, stayed execution on the 
judgment, and remanded the case for the trial court to determine 
whether the judgment was not final and, therefore, not subject to 
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execution or the judgment was final under the criteria of Rule 
54(b) and, therefore, subject to execution and appeal. Redding & 
Co. v. Russwine Constr. Corp., 417 F.2d at 727. 
The example of the Rone, Gregg and Bieber cases pointedly 
illustrates the unfairness of the position they argue. Rone, Gregg 
and Bieber argue that they have had judgments subject to execution 
for over seven years. Yet no final, appealable judgment has been 
entered in any of those cases. Indeed, an appealable judgment may 
never issue in those cases. The prospect that a plaintiff could 
recover his alleged injuries by executing on a partial judgment and 
deny the defendant an appeal by simply not proceeding to judgment 
on the plaintiff's remaining claims or against the remaining 
parties is fundamentally offensive. Article I, Section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution provides that: 
All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall 
be administered without denial or unneces-
sary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel any civil cause to which he is a 
party. 
The procedures advocated by appellants might enhance the ability 
of plaintiffs to recover judgments swiftly. Those procedures 
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would, however, also close the doors of the appellate courts to 
defendants and, thereby, violate Utah's Constitution. 
Finally, appellants overlook the fact that Rule 54(b) 
provides an efficient, clear resolution to the public policy 
concerns which they raise. Where a prevailing party needs to 
recover on a judgment that has been entered as to less than all 
claims or parties, Rule 54(b) provides the court a method of 
allowing recovery on a judgment that would otherwise not be final. 
For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bank of 
Lincolnwood v. Fed. Leasing, Inc., 622 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1980) 
noted that, "an important effect of a 54(b) certification is that 
the entry of judgment permits prompt execution." Indeed, in Bank 
of Lincolnwood. it was the plaintiff's need to immediately execute 
on a judgment against less than all parties that prompted the 
plaintiff's request for a Rule 54(b) certification, rather than any 
desire to immediately appeal that judgment. 
In summary, both state and federal authorities appear to 
uniformly hold that a judgment as to less than all claims or all 
parties is not a final judgment subject to execution, absent 
certification of that judgment as final under Rule 54(b). The Utah 
Supreme Court has directed that courts should "rely heavily" upon 
these federal decisions in construing the requirements of Utah's 
Rule 54(b). Thus, none of the Rone, Gregg and Bieber judgments are 
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final judgments because those judgments were entered as to less 
than all the parties to the litigation and none have been certified 
as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). Because the judgments are not 
final, they do not permit appellants7 attempted executions, nor do 
they give rise to judgment liens. 
III. APPELLANTS7 OBJECTIONS TO THE NIELDS' 
AND PETERSONS7 EVIDENCE ARE FRIVOLOUS. 
In their motion for summary judgment, the Nields and 
Petersons argued that even if Rone, Gregg and Bieber had valid, 
final judgments, those judgments did not attach to the Nield and 
Peterson homes because the Nields and Petersons were good faith 
purchasers for value, who acquired the homes without notice of any 
claim of Rone, Gregg and Bieber. In support of that argument, 
Patricia Nield and Mark Peterson submitted affidavits attesting 
that they did not know or have any dealings with the Vreekens, did 
not know that the Vreekens or any of the entities named as 
defendants in the Rone, Gregg and Bieber actions held any interest 
in the Nield or Peterson homes, and that they were unaware of any 
claims by Rone, Gregg and Bieber to those homes. [R. 324-27 and 
348-51.] In addition, Diane C. Green, an employee of Associated 
Title Company, submitted an affidavit attesting to the fact that 
she had examined Utah County records with respect to the Nield and 
Peterson homes and had found no record showing that any of the 
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individuals or entities named as defendants in the Rone, Gregg and 
Bieber action had ever held any interest in the Nield and Peterson 
homes. [R. 317-22]. Because the trial court concluded that Rone, 
Gregg and Bieber did not have final, valid judgments, the court did 
not reach the question of whether any such judgments would have 
attached to the Nield and Peterson homes. 
On appeal, Rone, Gregg and Bieber object that the 
affidavits set forth conclusory statements because, "they merely 
state [that the affiants] did not know." [Appellant's Brief at 
38.] Rone's, Gregg's and Bieber's objections to the affidavits 
are, first, irrelevant to the issues of this appeal. Because the 
trial court did not resolve the question of whether the Nield and 
Peterson homes would be subject to a lien in appellants' favor if 
appellants held valid, final judgments, resolution of the admis-
sibility of the affidavits is unnecessary to this appeal. 
In any event, Rone's, Gregg's and Bieber's objections are 
not well founded. The point of the Patricia Nield and Mark 
Peterson affidavits is that the Nields and Petersons did not know 
anything about the Vreekens or appellants' claims against the 
Vreekens. The adequacy of their personal knowledge of their own 
state of mind is apparent from the face of the affidavits. 
Likewise, the Green affidavit sets forth an appropriate foundation 
for her testimony. In her affidavit, Green attests as to her 
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qualifications to examine title to real property, to the fact that 
she examined title to the Nield and Peterson homes in the Utah 
County records, and as to the results of her examination. In sum, 
Rone's, Gregg's and Bieber's objections to this evidence are 
frivolous. 
Rone, Gregg and Bieber next object to the fact that the 
Nields and Petersons submitted certified copies of portions of the 
record in the Rone, Gregg and Bieber lawsuits. These documents 
included, for example, certified copies of the default judgments 
and complaints in those actions. Appellants do not object to the 
admissibility or the substance of this evidence. Instead, they 
object that it was inappropriate for the Nields and Petersons to 
provide the court with certified copies of these documents. 
Instead, the court should simply have been asked to take judicial 
notice of those pleadings. [Appellants' Brief at 38.] 
The point of appellants' argument is frivolous in the 
fullest sense, since it raises an issue of no significance to the 
resolution of the lawsuit. In addition, appellants position is 
wrong. Th« Utah Supreme Court has several times held that when the 
court is asked to consider the record in a prior lawsuit, the files 
of the other case should be placed in evidence before the court. 
State in Interest of Hales. 538 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1975). See Carter 
v. Carter. 563 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1977). As the Utah Supreme 
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Court noted, providing the court and opposing counsel with copies 
of materials from the other litigation for which judicial notice 
is sought allows both the court and the opposing party to know 
precisely what in the record is being relied on. Again, appel-
lants' objections to Nields' and Petersons' evidence are frivolous. 
IV. APPELLANTS' APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
that: 
Except in a first appeal of right in 
a criminal case, if the court determines 
that a motion made or appeal taken under 
these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages, which 
may include single or double costs, as 
defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable 
attorney's fees, to the prevailing party. 
The court may order that the damages be 
paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney. 
The rule further defines a "frivolous appeal" as being "one that 
is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good-faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law." See O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987)("we define a 'frivolous appeal' as one having no 
reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a).")• The 
totality of appellants' argument falls clearly under the scope of 
Rule 33. See Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 398 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1987) . However, the Nields and Petersons will cite only three 
respects in which this appeal is frivolous and unwarranted. 
The first and most egregious instance of unwarranted 
conduct is Rone's attempt to execute on his alleged "judgment" and 
continuation of that attempt before this court. Rone's judgment 
was clearly and directly declared invalid by this court nearly two 
years ago. Without ever revealing to the Nields and Petersons that 
first the district court and then this Court had declared his 
judgment to be invalid, Rone attempted to enforce that judgment 
against the Nields and Petersons. 
In complete disregard of this court's prior decision, 
Rone demands the right to relitigate the very issues already 
conclusively decided by this court. The fact that this court's 
prior decision in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken should have resolved any 
question regarding the validity of Rone's judgment could not be 
clearer and Rone offers no defense to his complete disregard of 
that decision. Moreover, the consequences of Rone's disregard of 
this Court's prior ruling have been visited upon completely 
innocent parties. The Nields and Petersons submit that Rone's 
conduct is so egregious, and the suffering imposed on these 
innocent parties so unwarranted as to merit the severest penalties 
under Rule 33. 
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The second respect in which this appeal violates the 
standards of Rule 33 is the pursuit of this appeal by Gregg and 
Bieber in light of this Court's decision in Demetropoulos v. 
Vreeken. Rone, Gregg and Bieber are, of course, represented by the 
same counsel, so it must be concluded that Gregg and Bieber were 
aware that the Rone judgment had been held to be invalid by this 
Court. Exactly the same defects in service of process exist in all 
three cases. In the face of the clear invalidity of all three 
"judgments," Gregg's and Bieber's infliction of this appeal upon 
wholly innocent parties is unwarranted. The sole difference 
between the conduct of Rone and that of Gregg and Bieber lies in 
the fact that Rone's conduct in this action was expressly forbidden 
of the terms of this Court's decision in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken. 
To reach the same determination with respect to Gregg and Bieber 
required only the simplest analysis of that decision. 
Finally, Rone, Gregg and Bieber present no reasonable 
argument that their judgments are final for purposes for execution. 
Instead, they ignore the uniform law to the contrary. Appellants 
have compounded their failure to follow Rule 54 by treating their 
non-final judgments against some of the defendants in their 
lawsuits as equivalent to judgments against all of the defendants 
in those actions or as judgments against entities not even named 
as parties to those suits, on the theory that the defaulting and 
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non-defaulting defendants are alter egos of one another and a 
judgment against one is, therefore, a judgment against all. 
[Appellants' Brief at 20.] Relying on this theory, which has never 
been supported by any judgment of the court in any of the relevant 
lawsuits, appellants have indiscriminately proceeded to attempt 
executions on property that was never owned by any of the defen-
dants in the Rone, Gregg and Bieber Judgments. Indeed, in 1983, at 
the start of the Rone lawsuit, appellants' counsel certified to 
the court that he had examined the public records of Utah County, 
and determined that none of the defendants owned any real property 
in Utah County. [R. 432-37.] Appellants' reckless disregard for 
procedural requirements and the rights and interests of innocent 
third parties and continuation of such conduct into this appeal 
mandates the imposition of sanctions under Rule 33. 
CONCLUSION 
Rone, Gregg and Bieber devote a great deal of their brief 
to arguing the ways in which Kurt and Fred Vreeken have injured 
appellants and to detailing some of the alleged fictitious entities 
used by the Vreekens to commit such frauds. These arguments are, 
for the most part# irrelevant to the issue of whether appellants 
are entitled to satisfy their claims against the Vreekens at the 
expense of the Nields and Petersons. Whether the Vreekens have 
defrauded appellants is largely irrelevant because appellants have 
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never bothered to secure judgments against the Vreekens. Certainly 
the Nields and Peterson have never injured appellants nor partici-
pated in any scheme of the Vreekens to injure appellants. 
Appellants, thus, largely neglect the issues that this Court must 
decide: whether appellants possess valid judgments and whether 
such judgments are final for purposes of execution. 
The determination as to the validity of the Rone judgment 
could not be simpler. In Demetropoulos v. Vreeken this Court 
squarely held the Rone judgment to be invalid. The invalidity of 
the Gregg and Bieber judgments is equally clear. The Rone judgment 
was invalid because Rone did not effect service of process on an 
authorized agent for the entities against which default was 
subsequently entered. The same evidence establishes that Gregg and 
Bieber, likewise, enter default judgment against entities as to 
which Gregg and Bieber have not effected proper service of process. 
Under Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, all three of the Rone, Gregg and 
Bieber judgments are invalid and will not, therefore, support any 
execution against the homes of the Nields and Petersons. 
Even if it is assumed that the Rone, Gregg and Bieber 
judgments are valid, those judgments are not final for purposes of 
execution. In construing the provisions of Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court has directed courts of 
this state to "rely heavily upon decisions under the federal rule 
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to explain the operation and underlying rationale of our Rule 
54(b)." Olson v. Salt Lake Citv School Dist.. 724 P.2d at 965 n. 
5. Federal cases uniformly hold that a judgment as to less than 
all claims or parties is not final for purposes* of execution, 
unless made final by a certification under Rule 54(b). Because the 
Rone, Gregg and Bieber judgments involve less than all the parties 
to each respective lawsuit and because no certification under Rule 
54(b) has ever been issued for any of those judgments, the 
judgments are not final, do not give rise to judgment liens, and 
do not allow Rone, Gregg and Bieber to execute upon the Nield and 
Peterson homes. 
Finally, Rone's, Gregg's and Bieber's pursuit of this 
appeal warrants the imposition of sanctions under Rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Most clearly, Rone's continued 
assertion of the validity of his judgment in direct disregard of 
this Court's prior holding in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken must be the 
most egregious violation of Rule 33 that can be imagined. Gregg's 
and Bieber#s pursuit of their appeals in light of the fact that 
their judgments are invalid for precisely the same reason as Rone's 
is conduct nearly as egregious. Finally, Rone's, Gregg's and 
Bieber's continued pursuit of judgments that are not final under 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is unwarranted. 
The trial court's summary judgment should be affirmed and sanctions 
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awarded to the Nields and Petersons under Rule 33 of the Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this 7^ day of June, 1990. 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
MICHAEL M. LATER ^ 
Attorneys for Respondents Lon S. 
Nield, Patricia L. Nield, V, Mark 
Peterson and Nancy L. Peterson 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 





KURT VREE KEN, et a l , 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 63,522 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST SOME 
OF THE DEFENDANTS, i e . , 
MONEY FACTORS SYNDICATE, AG; 
FIRST FEDERAL FINANCE, AG; 
AIRES + SERV, SA; 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CONFERENCE; 
AND OPTION WRITERS SYNDICATE 
In this action the defendants Money Factors Syndicate; First Federal 
Finance, AG; Aires + Serv, SA; International Investment Conference; and 
Option Writers Syndicate having been regularly served with summons and 
having fa i led to answer or otherwise plead to the complaint.within the 
time allowed by law, and the default of said defendants having been 
entered according to law, 
Now therefore, upon motion of George M. McCune, of McCune & McCune., 
attorneys for p l a i n t i f f , 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows, to-wit: 
1 . P l a i n t i f f is granted judgment against defendants Money Factors 
Syndicate, a business ent i ty ; First Federal Finance, AG, a business ent i ty ; 
Aires + Serv, SA, a business ent i ty ; International Investment Conference, 
a business ent i ty; and Option Writers Syndicate, a business ent i ty , j o i n t l y 
and severally, in the amount of $10,050.00 principal investment paid in 
violat ion of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (T i t le 6 1 , Chapter 1 , Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended); $506.63 interest at 8% per annum from 
December 8, 1982, through July 26, 1983; $3,000.00 attorney fees pursuant to 
Section 61-1-22, UCA 1953, as amended, and $206.75 costs of court herein, 
for a total judgment in the sum of $13,763.38, with interest at the legal 
rate of interest at 12% per annum from date of judgment until paid. orc 
t~> O t 
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2. The cause of action agar 
DATED this *P~A day of 
Defendants herein remains open. 
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"0 «W 25 % ih 20 
George M. McCune 
McCUNE & McCUNE *^L'AM^HUIS»UlltRK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff — -r^^^ftfy 
96 East 100 South ,' 
P.O. Box 746 l ^ 
P rovo , Utah 84603-0746 
Telephone (801) 373-0307 
IN AND FDR UTAH COUNTY, S FA i E OF UTAH 
v O - - • • •• " . ' 
RONALD A. BIEBER, dba R A D - ) 
an individual; R A B RANCH, a ) 
business entity, ) Civ il f Ic 64,055 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
J DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST SOME 
vs ) OF THE DEFENDANTS, i e . f 
) CHRIS VREEKEN; KEITH VREEKEN; 
KURT VREEKEN, et a ) , ) MONEY FACTORS SYNDICATE 
) FIRST FEDERAL FINANCE, AG; 
Dpfend. ml\ ) INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CONFERENCE; 
) AND OPTION WRITERS SYNDICATE 
In t h i s action the defendants Chris Vreeken; Keith Vreeken; Money 
Factors Syndicate; F i rs t Federal Finance, AG; Aires + Serv, SA; Internat ional 
I i I1' 2stment Conference; and Option Wri ters Syndicate having been regular ly 
served w i th summons and having f a i l e d to answer or otherwise plead to 1 h^ -
• :omp Ia in t w i th in the time allowed by law, ai id the defaul t of said defendants 
having been i entered according to law, 
|Now therefore, upon motion of George M McCune, of McCune & McCi in- =:, 
attorneys for p la in t ii II! ' f 
I T I S HEREBY ORE Ell IEC , ADJUDGED AND DECREED a s f o l l o w s , t o - w i t : 
] P l a i n t i f f is granted judgment against defendants Chris Vreel ; 2i i; 
Keith Vreeken; IMoney Factors Syndicate, a business e n t i t y ; F i r s t Federal 
Finance, AG, a business e n t i t y ; A ires + Serv, SA, a business e n t i t y ; 
In ternat iona l Investment Conference, a business e n t i t y ; and Opt ion Wr i t e r s 
Syndicate, a business e n t i t y , j o i n t l y and severally i i i the amount of 
$44,365.44 pr inc ipal investment paid ii i v i o l a t i o n of the Utah Uniform 
Secur i t ies Act (T i t le 61 , Cihaptei 1 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended); 
$2,314.30 in terest at B% per annum fr om Octobei 1. 1982, thi o i 
• ' 11983; $1,000.00 attorney fees put suant to Section 61-1- 22, UCf o 3 , » 
McCUNE ft McCUNE / ATTORNEYS A 1 LAW / 96 EAST 100 SOUTH / IP O BOX 746 , PROVC), U 1 A* I 84603 0746 / TELEPHONE (801) 373 1)307 
amended, -: $?"\25 cost- ~x * h r -^ " " *~~ a to ta l jiud'jnient, nil II Ihti" 
sum of $4" ,739.99, wi th ^mer t - i : ••,'•;• ?.: >v legal rate of in terest 
2^ pe- --'-r r 'pv, v\c- . • udgnent un t i l ' - i d . 
*r- dsid^.st other defendants herein remains open. ; --ause of aippG* 
DATi *;ri : > / S ^ dav 
INNEXEC ^ O J ^ S T ON FILE IN MY OFflC* A> 
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George M. McCune 
McCUNE & McCUNE 
Attorneys f o r P l a i n t i f f 
96 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 746 
Provo, Utah 84603-0746 
Telephone (801) 373-0307 
BOWS 2 , #f||: /g 
*«.UAMf.HUISH.Cl£BK 
DISCTRICT C0UPT OF THE cru 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY. sTAT^ ::F UTAH 
JAMES A. Li l i j i i , 
PI a ii i t i f f , 
KURT VREEKEN, et a/1, 
C i y i 1 I lo 6 3 , 9 2 3 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST SOME 
OF THE DEFENDANTS, i e . , 
CHRIS VREEKEN, KEITH VREEKEN; 
MONEY FACTORS SYNDICATE; 
FIRST FEDERAL FINANCE, AG; 
AIRES + SERV, SA; 
NTtKNATIONAL INVESTMENT CONFERENCE. 
AND OPTION WRITERS SYNDICATE 
5 *:.,: he defendants l h r i r * w—•"*•*• * 
Factors Syndicate, * > r ; 
stment Conferer - <t 
ken, Mi.un / 
-\ ' re s * : \: *\ " ,i A, i nte r rid 11 u m i 
on Wri ters vndicate having oeen regular ly sen'1" i 
* i :h - j » _ . and hav - ; f^ r-- -K^W * - ^ - v 5 - ^ r1-*!' to the complanit 
w i th in the time a n )w-e by law, j i rrK j e M i / ^ - - d defendants having 
been entered according ^ 
nere r^e J:K - motu>r .f Geor^e v M:C;jne, cf M^Cune & McCune, 
attorney* f i r ; • °u : " T , 
^
:
 ritk:r< ORDERED, ADJUDGEC AK1 DECREED u ^oVowr t o - w i t : 
la in t -< + q r a ^ i - j judgnent aga"< ' :efendants Chris Vreeken; 
Keith V,r"f-PikrPr. K\r»y Factors Sy ' i ca te - . ^ *.usines *-m'*y, r i r r j t Fpdnral 
• •'•es * • • - ' . - m. ruh^z e n t i t y , In te rmt - ' ^ .a 
e r . f t
 t win Wri ters Syndicate, <i 
•w : i ie amount r : " \G00.0U pr inc ipa l 
he UtaL _:..#orr> Secur i t ies A n ( T i t l e 6 1 , 
951% :s amended,. 4 ^nterest dl 8* 
Financt LUST es' ^ 
Investment Confe r er r f . 11-
busines e r t i t v , . r ' p t , y a ^ \> 
i rvestn- * : * • y 
Cnaptei * ,_ ; Annotated 
M < C t I , IN'E * McC *J*r / A T W > R M t v s * , - i A W ^ $ 6 £ A S * t&C SCH/TV P-o SC * >4b / P R O V O , ^ h C * <. * r ! F L E P H O N E (8011 3 7 3-0; 
*F\-
per annun from December ' , " I ,', ""p'U'j " y ,:IJ, l'"'J i, t l ,000.00 
attorney fees pursuant to Section b l - l w 7 , MCA 1953, as amended, and 
$51-25 costs of COIF* herein, f"« 4 to ta l j udpen t in the sun of 
$32,576.73, w i th in te res t thereon at the le*.|al M I I ..f intp»"ps! u.l 
per ai iniiTi from date of judgment un t i l paid 
2. Ilihe cause of a^tjton agaiprf other tefei idai i1 ,s I < : i • Ai i i < s i i< ii ; , • )pen 
DATED th -• ^ f d a y o f ( ^ A ^ J / _ S 198X 
I f)Cf 
1 I' to 
f lAT* Of 01AM I SS 
COUNTY Of UTAH | .
 £ 0lsTtlCT COtlW 
^ " i h W B MY HAND .NO « « . OF WO COW ™ 
MeCUNE & McCUNE / ATTORNEYS A 1 I A/'W / 9 6 EAST 100 SOUTH / P O. BOX, 746 / PROVO UTAH 84603-0746 < TELEPHONE (801) 373 10O7* !, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. 4 r i : 7CH 
t r\e and correct cop\ oi ': u*-* luregoing -5r:ei i , -^ poncici.to 
server '-" * , j : -• • nereji ^ Jnitea ^ - e - M.i , 1 ,
 :)os4 
George M. McCune < Esq 
524 3 Carpel 1 Avr-'je 
F. 0, Eiox 13044 
Salt Lake City, Jtah 34118 
^ +.4-^ v-*^ o" ^ ->v- vrp]!?/fts 
Guy i* ^ .rnmghan, Esq. 
Deputy -. unty At^^^p^ 
75 Ea>: '00 Sout 
Frovo, Utah 34* . ". 
'" rney tor Derenda^v Da v Id R. Bate;r--\ 
nis capacity of sheriff of Utah 
Cou: * *> State if Utah 
SNOW, ./Hfcl ^ Tf-N:..' J i y/-?TINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondents 
7\frU+^ ^DfJstUfrLy 
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